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FUTURE INTERESTS - OIL AND GAS - .APPUCABILITY OF THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES TO R.EMOT.E FUTURE INT.ER.EST FOLLOWING RES.ERV.ED OIL AND 
GAS INT.ER.EST - A grantor conveyed real property to defendant reserving 
"all oil and gas and all minerals" in and under the land "for the period of 
twenty-five years . • • and as long thereafter as oil or gas or petroleum 
products" should be produced. Following this reservation, but in another 
clause of the deed, the grantor provided, "Subject to the reservations and 
conditions aforesaid, [grantor] hereby grants ... all of said real property 
••• to the [defendant], together with .•. the reversion and reversions 
.•. thereof." Some years later, the same grantor quitclaimed to the 
plaintiff "all oil and gas in and under" the same property. The plaintiff 
sued to quiet title in the oil and gas, arguing that because the defendant's 
interest, which was to begin on the termination of the grantor's reserved 
interest, was void for remoteness under the Rule against Perpetuities,1 
the entire interest in oil and gas remained in the grantor and was effectively 
transferred to the plaintiff by the quitclaim deed. Judgment was entered 
quieting title in the defendant.2 On appeal, held, affirmed. Even if the com-
mon gt1U1tor's attempt to grant a future interest in oil and gas to the 
defendant was void under the Rule against Perpetuities, the common 
grantor thereupon "held" that interest as a reversion and this reversion was 
1 The provision applicable to the conveyance is Art. XX, §9 of the California Constitu-
tion: "No perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary purposes." 2 MASON, CON-
STITUTION OF CALIFORNIA (1953). The provision requires estates to vest "within lives in 
being and twenty-one years." See Estate of Sahlender, 89 Cal. App. (2d) 329,201 P. (2d) 69 
(1948). 
2 The defendant had brought cross actions seeking such relief. During suit the twenty-
five year period elapsed, no oil or gas ever having been produced. 
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effectively conveyed to the defendant by the last clause in the same deed. 
Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, 51 Cal. (2d) 33, 330 P. (2d) 775 
(1958).3 
It is generally accepted that the Rule against Perpetuities is applicable 
to executory interests but not to possibilities of reverter even though there 
is little difference in the quantum of these two future interests.4 And if 
a grantor transfers his possibility of reverter at a later time in a deed other 
than the one in which he conveyed the precedent indeterminate estate, 
his grantee is likewise deemed to hold a possibility of reverter immunized 
from the Rule.5 But the holding of the principal case, in allowing an 
executory interest, invalid as too remote, to pass sheltered from the rule 
under the guise of a reversion in a subsequent clause of the same deed 
seems highly questionable.6 Indeed, the suggestion of the court that the 
grantor retained or "held" a reversionaty interest for a length of time 
sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the defendant received a re-
versionary interest cannot be reconciled with the fact that a deed becomes 
instantaneously operative in its entirety at the momerit of execution and 
delivery.7 In grounding the result of the principal case on such extremely 
tenuous grounds the court managed to avoid an important question which 
was squarely presented by the facts and the arguments of the parties, 
8 This decision affirmed Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, (Cal. App. 1958) 321 
P. (2d) 835. Compare Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal. App. (2d) 222, 270 P. 
(2d) 604 (1954), discussed in note 8 infra. 
4 See 3 SIMES AND SMITH, FtlTuRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1235 et seq. (1956). The distinc-
tion has been criticized, and it has been suggested that possibilities of reverter and other 
reversionary interests should be subject to the rule. See, e.g., Leach, "Perpetuities in 
Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HAR.v. L. REv. 721 at 741 (1952). 
The granting of a future interest, with reservation of a determinable fee, seems indis· 
tinguishable from an attempt to create an executory interest and the validity of the future 
interest should be tested by the Rule against Perpetuities. No one, except the California 
court, has yet suggested that executory interests should be called reversionary interests 
to avoid the rule. (A reversion in oil and gas could arise only in a grantor upon a con-
veyance of a present "possessory interest" which was less than the total interest of the 
grantor.) 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FtlTuRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §8.1 (1956)'. 
5 See 3 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1235 (1956); Leach, "Perpetuities 
in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HAR.v. L. REv. 721 at 743 (1952). 
6 The common grantor obviously did not intend the final clause in the first deed to 
pass the defendant's interest in oil and gas; absent such intent, the effect of passing the 
interest should not be assigned to the clause. See 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §12.44 
(1952). 
7 See 3 SIMES AND SMITH, FtlTuRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1241 (1956). But see Brown v. 
Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. (2d) 922 (1950), where, 
in connection with a will, an executory interest void under the rule against perpetuities 
was held to pass as a reversion under the residuary clause to the same persons who were 
intended to take the void executory interest. There, however, the determinable fee had been 
granted to a third party. Apparently no one has undertaken to criticize the decision ser-
iously. Discussions point out that the exemption of possibilities of reverter from opera-
tion of the Rule against Perpetuities made either alternative that faced the court undesir-
able. See note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 864 (1951); Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending 
the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 at 741 (1952). Professor Leach does, 
however, express a preference for a construction which would deny the double operation of 
an executed document. 
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namely, whether the Rule against Perpetuities should be applicable to a 
future interest which follows a grantor's reservation of an interest in oil and 
gas for an indeterminate time.s Conflicting theories as to the nature of a 
landowner's interest in oil and gas under his land suggest different answers 
to this problem.9 Some states have decided that oil and gas can be owned 
as a separate estate in the land.10 In contrast, other states have held that 
an oil and gas interest can be no more than an exclusive right to drill and 
remove these minerals.U In these latter jurisdictions the interest in oil and 
gas is considered incorporeal, and when separated by conveyance from the 
surface estate has the incidents of a profit a prendre.12 In states espousing 
this non-ownership theory, future interests in oil and gas intended for the 
present owner of the surface estate may be saved from the Rule against 
Perpetuities by means of an argument suggested by Professor Gray.13 The 
argument states that even if an incorporeal interest in land might terminate 
at a remote time, the rule does not apply to the succeeding interest if the 
prior interest terminates by disappearing into the servient estate rather than 
vesting in a third party.14 In other words, such interests are simply ex-
S In Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., note 3 supra, a grantor of real property 
reserved an interest in oil and gas for twenty years and as long thereafter as oil and gas 
were produced; the interest was to terminate if no oil or gas were found within five years, 
and the grantor was to pay royalty to the grantee. The grantee's interest in oil and gas 
(other than the royalty) was held void because of the Rule against Perpetuities. See com-
ment, 53 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1955). The decision in the principal case merely causes con-
fusion for persons who desire to know the status of such arrangements. 
9 For general discussions of the prevailing property theories concerning oil and gas, 
see 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS, c. 4 (1938); Cohen, "Property Theories Affecting the Land-
owner in a New Oil and Gas Producing State," IO ALA. L. REv. 323 (1958). 
10 See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915). 
11 See, e.g., Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. (2d) llO at l17, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935). Oil 
and gas in their natural state are locked tightly in place, and in general migrate if, and 
only if, the pool in which they lie is tapped by drilling. It was originally believed that they 
migrated under ground as water does. See the discussion of these matters in Cohen, 
"Property Theories Affecting the Landowner in a New Oil and Gas Producing State," 
10 ALA. L. REv. 323 at 325-327 (1958). Every jurisdiction which has had occasion to pass 
upon the issue holds that, exclusive of statute, a landowner has no cause of action for oil 
and gas drained from beneath his lands by drilling on adjacent tracts. See, e.g., Western 
Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. (2d) 299, 206 P. (2d) 944 (1949) (non-
ownership jurisdiction); Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. State, (Tex. Com. App. 1921) 231 
S.W. 1088 (ownership in place jurisdiction). It is also uniformly held, however, that the 
oil and gas estate can be severed from the surface estate and carved up into lesser in-
terests. See, e.g., Brown v. Copp, 105 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 232 P. (2d) 868 (1951); 1 SUM-
MERS, OIL AND GAS, §133, p. 322 (1938); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPER.TY §10.6 (1952). Also, 
an interest in oil and gas is not subject to loss by abandonment. See 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND 
GAS §139 (1938). In light of these holdings, it is understandable that there might be some 
difference of opinion in categorizing this interest. 
12 "It is generally recognized that the ownership or title to oil and gas in place is a 
limited interest of estate in land in the nature of a profit a prendre • ••• " Lever v. Smith, 
30 Cal. App. (2d) 667 at 670, 87 P. (2d) 66 (1939). A profit a prendre is defined as an 
incorporeal right to take something of substance from the land of another. 3 TIFFANY, 
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §839 (1939). 
13 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPErUITIES, 4th ed., §279 (1942). 
14 Compare 3 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTl.lRE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1248 (1956). 
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tinguished, and upon their "merger" with the servient estate, no new 
estate begins which could be subject to invalidation by remoteness.16 But 
in jurisdictions holding that the landowner owns oil and gas as corporeal 
property, this argument is not applicable in cases where the owner excepts 
ownership in those substances from a conveyance of the surface estate.16 
However, the validity of the present landowner's future interest in the 
minerals under his surface estate should not depend upon categorization 
of the interest as corporeal or incorporeal.17 Property categories which 
were not designed to take account of the peculiar features of interests in oil 
and gas cannot serve as satisfactory criteria for resolving all controversies 
arising out of such interests.18 Rather than attempting doubtful categoriza-
tion in order to resolve the perpetuities question, it would seem desirable to 
resort directly to the policy considerations involved in special circumstances 
like those in the principal case. One such consideration is that separation 
of oil and gas interests, for purposes other than immediate development, 
tends to hinder the rapid and orderly development of these vital resources, 
since many holders of these interests disappear and others use their interest 
to prevent the development of the oil and gas while exploiting more 
valuable holdings elsewhere.19 Furthermore, a protracted separation may 
unduly hinder the useful over-all development of the entire tract.20 
In view of these arguments, it would seem that the Rule against Perpetuities 
should not be applied to void a future interest in oil and gas where the 
result would be to enlarge the reserved mineral interest from one limited to 
the duration of active production to one in fee, thereby extending in-
definitely the separation of mineral and surface interests. 
Robert B. Nelson, S.Ed. 
16 Cf. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §8.98 (1952). Since California follows the non-
ownership theory, the court could have used Gray's argument to resolve the controversy in 
the principal case. 
16 It would have application where a grantor merely reserved a right to take the 
substances. 
17 In view of the facts mentioned in note 11 supra, an assertion that interests in oil 
and gas are either corporeal or incorporeal can mean only that they appear, to those 
making the assertion, to be "more like" interests of the one type than of the other. 
18 See, generally, Ballem, "Pitfalls in the Categorization of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Leases,'' 2 UNIV. B.C. I.Aw NOTES 329 (1956). 
19 See Cohen, "Property Theories Affecting the Landowner in a New Oil and Gas 
Producing State,'' 10 ALA. L. R.Ev. 323 at 337 (1958). 
20 In several states severed estates in oil and gas can be terminated for non-user. Tenn. 
Code Ann. (1955) §64-704 (ten-year limitation); La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1945) §789 (ten-year 
limitation). In Crawford v. Texas Co., (W.D. La. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 218, the Louisiana 
statute was applied to facts similar to those in the principal case. In Virginia a severed 
title to oil and gas may be extinguished under certain conditions after 35 years non-user. 
Va. Code (1950) §55-154. 
